In his well-known paper \How computer should think" ( Be77b]) Belnap argues that four valued semantics is a very suitable setting for computerized reasoning. In this paper we vindicate this thesis by showing that the logical role that the four-valued structure has among Ginsberg's well-known bilattices is similar to the role that the two-valued algebra has among Boolean algebras. Speci cally, we provide several theorems that show that the most useful bilatticevalued logics can actually be characterized as four-valued inference relations. In addition, we compare the use of three-valued logics with the use of four-valued logics, and show that at least for the task of handling inconsistent or uncertain information, the comparison is in favor of the latter.
Introduction
In Be77a, Be77b] Belnap introduced a logic intended to deal in a useful way with inconsistent and incomplete information. This logic is based on a structure called FOUR, which has four truth values: the classical ones, t and f, and two new ones: ? that intuitively denotes lack of information (no knowledge), and > that indicates inconsistency (\over"-knowledge). Belnap gave quite convincing arguments why \the way a computer should think" should be based on these four values. In Gi87, Gi88] Ginsberg proposed algebraic structures called bilattices that naturally generalize Belnap's FOUR. The idea is to consider arbitrary number of truth values, and to arrange them (like in FOUR) in two closely related partial orders, each forming a lattice. The original motivation of Ginsberg for introducing bilattices was to provide a uniform approach for a diversity of applications in AI. Bilattices were further investigated by Fitting, who showed that they and are useful also for providing semantic to logic programs Fi90a, Fi91, Fi93, Fi94] . In AA94, AA96] we presented bilattice-based logics and corresponding proof systems. These logics turned out to have many desirable properties (like paraconsistency). In the present paper we proceed with this logical approach. In particular, we consider bilattice-based logics that are preferential in the sense of Shoham Sh87, Sh88] , i.e.: they are based on the idea that inferences should be taken not according to all models of a given theory, but only w.r.t. a subset of them, determined according to certain preference criteria. We use here two main guidelines for making such preferences among bilattice-based models: 1. Prefer models that assume as much consistency as possible. This approach re ects the intuition that contradictory data corresponds to inadequate information about the real world, and therefore should be minimized. 2 . Prefer models that assume a minimal amount of knowledge; The idea this time is that we should not assume anything that is not really known.
FOUR, the structure that corresponds to Belnap four-valued logic, is the minimal bilattice, exactly as the structure that is based on the classical two values is the minimal Boolean algebra.
The main goal of this paper is to show that the logical role of FOUR among bilattices is also very similar to that the two-valued algebra has among Boolean algebras. Indeed, it turned out that all the natural bilattice-valued logics that we had introduced for various purposes can be characterized using only the four basic values! This does not mean, of course, that from now on bilattices have no value (exactly as the fact, that Boolean algebras can be characterized in ft; fg, does not mean that Boolean algebras have no value). It does demonstrate, however, the fundamental role of the four values.
In an opposite direction to that taken by Ginsberg and Fitting, other authors tried to get along by using just three values for achieving the same (or similar) goals. We show, however, that the use of four values is preferable to the use of three even for tasks that can in principle be handled using only three values.
Taken together, the main import of our results is a strong vindication (so we believe) of Belnap's thesis concerning the fundamental importance of the four basic values for the goal of computerized reasoning.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce a propositional language with four-valued semantics. Our language is based on the basic bilattice operators together with an appropriate implication connective. In Section 3 we show the adequacy of this language by exploring its expressive power as well as those of its fragments. Section 4 is devoted to introducing the most important consequence relations that are based on FOUR, and to an examination of their main properties. In Section 5 we compare four-valued formalisms with three valued ones, and in Section 6 we generalize the four-valued logics of Section 4 to arbitrary bilattices. The main results of this section is that by doing so we do not get any new logic. Finally, in Section 7 we summarize the main results and conclusions of this work. 2 The language and its four-valued semantics 2 
.1 The algebraic structure and its basic connectives
The truth values of Belnap's logic mentioned above have two natural orderings:
First we have the standard logical partial order, t , which intuitively re ects di erences in the \measure of truth" that every value represents. According to this order, f is the minimal element, t Figure 1 . 
Designated elements and models
The next step in using FOUR for reasoning is to choose its set of designated elements. The obvious choice is D=ft; >g, since both values intuitively represent formulae known to be true. The set D has the property that a^b2D i a b2D i both a and b are in D, while a_b2D i a b2D i either a or b is in D. From this point the various semantic notions are de ned on FOUR as natural generalizations of similar classical notions: A valuation is a function that assigns a truth value from FOUR to each atomic formula. Any valuation is extended to complex formulae in the obvious way. We will sometimes write : b 2 instead of ( ) = b. A valuation satis es i ( ) 2D .
A valuation that satis es every formula in a given set ? of formulae is a model of ?. The set of all models of ? is denoted mod(?). The structure FOUR together with D as the set of the designated elements will be denoted in the sequel by hFOURi.
Implication connectives
Unlike in the classical calculus, Belnap's logic has no tautologies. Thus, excluded middle is not valid in it. This implies that the de nition of the material implication p7 !q as :p_q is not adequate there for representing entailments. We introduce therefore instead the following implications and equivalence operation on FOUR:
De nition 2. Notes: 1. Unlike the connectives of the basic language, the new connectives are not monotone w.r.t. k .
2. On ft; fg the material implication (7 !) and the two new implications are identical, so also the connectives of De nition 2.1 are generalizations of the classical implication. 3. The sense in which is a true implication will be clari ed in Proposition 4.3 below. Denote this set of assertions by ?. The rst assertion of ? is formulated by a weaker \implication" than the other two, since it is an instance of a rule that has exceptions. The six four-valued models of ? are given in Figure 2 . In this section we examine the expressive power of the language we intoduced above. We do it from two di erent points of view (which happen to be equivalent in the two-valued case, but are not so in general).
Canonical examples

Characterization of subsets of F OUR n
Notation 3.1 For a set of formulae ? denote by A(?) the set of atomic formulae that appear in some formula of ?, and by L(?) the set of literals that appear in some formula of ?. De nition 3.2 Let be a formula so that A( ) fp 1 ; : : :; p n g. S n , the subset of FOUR n which is characterized by , is:
S n = f(a 1 ; a 2 ; : : :; a n )2FOUR n j 8 (81 i n (p i )=a i ) =) ( )2D]g Proposition 3.3 A subset S of FOUR n is characterizable by some formula in the language of f:; g ( Note: Obviously, the characterizing formula is much simpler in the f:;^; g-language, where we can use^instead of ^and _ instead of _.
>From Proposition 3.3 it follows that the language of f:; g should be extended in order to get full characterization of subsets of FOUR n . One possibility is to add the propositional constant f: Theorem 3.4 Every subset of FOUR n is characterizable in the language of f:; ; fg Proof: All we need to change in the proof of Proposition 3.3 is to use f instead of f n in the de nition of ã i . After this change the ^-conjunction of the new ã i 's characterizes fãg and not f>;ãg. This su ces (using _) for the characterization of every nonempty set. The empty set itself is characterized by f. 2 Note: Since f = :(? ?), the language of f:; ; ?g also su ces for representing all subsets of FOUR n . Proposition 3.3 entails that one cannot delete f from the set f:; ; fg and retain the validity of Theorem 3.4. We next show that : and cannot be deleted either: Corollary 3.5 is not de nable in terms of the other connectives we consider here. Proof: By Theorem 3.4 it is su cient to show that f?g (for example) is not characterizable in the language f:;^; _; ; ; t; f; ?; >g. 1 This follows from the fact that these connectives are all k -monotone. We turn now to investigate the expressive power of the various fragments of our language which include at least the basic classical language L=f:;^; _; g. From the discussion before Example 3.9 it follows that there are at most eight such fragments, corresponding to extending L with some subset of (say) f ; ; fg. Our next theorem provides exact characterizations of the expressive power of each of these fragments, implying that they are all di erent from each other. We show that there is a correspondence between these eight fragments and the various possible combinations of the following three conditions: Following these guidelines, it is not di cult to prove the theorem. We show part 1 as an example, leaving the rest to the reader.
Assume then that g :FOUR n ! FOUR satis es I { III. De ne:
g is in the language of f:;^; g. We show that g represents g. Letx2FOUR n and assume that (p i )=x i for i=1;: : :; n.
Case 1: g(x) = t. By condition I,x 6 =>. Since g(x) 6 = f this implies thatx 6 2 f>g g ?1 (ffg).
Therefore ( g f ) 6 2f>; tg and so ( g f f n ) = t. The facts that ( g > > n ) = t and ( g ? ? 0 n ) = t follows similarly. Hence ( g )=t=g(x).
Case 2: g(x)=f. Again, by condition Ix6 =>, and so (f n )=f. In addition, ( g f )2ft; >g in this case, and so ( g f f n )=f. It follows that ( g )=f =g(x).
Case 3a: g(x)=> andx=>. Since g is in the language of f:;^; g, also ( g )=>=g(x). We conclude this section with a short discussion on the minimality of the set of connectives in each case. By Corollaries 3.5 and 3.6, neither : nor can be deleted from any of the sets of connectives which we have provided in each case. Theorem 3.10 and Corollary 3.11 imply that none of the connectives in f ; ; fg can be deleted in case it is included in the set we construct. 6 This leaves only the question of the necessity of^. We shall content ourselves with an example in which this connective is necessary, and an example in which it is not. Proposition 3.12 The functionally complete set f:;^; ; >; ?g considered in Theorem 3.8 is minimal in the sense that no connective can be deleted from it without losing the functional completeness.
Proof: We have discussed already the necessity of :; ; > and ? (again: ? takes here the role of and f together). To show that^is also indispensable we prove, by induction on the structure of formulae, that no formula (p; q) in the language of f:; ; >; ?g de nes a function g such that g(t; ?)=? while g(>; t)=>. In particular^itself is not de nable in this language. 2
The set f:;^; ; >; ?g is not minimal in the sense of the number of connectives in it. The next proposition shows that there is a smaller set which is functionally complete. Proposition 3.13 The set f:; ; ; ?g is functionally complete for FOUR. Proof: > and f are de nable from this set as shown in the discussion before Example 3.9. Now, de ne: p u q = (p ^q) ((:p :q) ^q) The relevant properties of u are the following:
Now, given a function g :FOUR n ! FOUR, de ne:
It is easy now to check that g characterizes g. 2 6 Although one can always replace by >, and the pair f ; f g by ?. 7 See the proof of Theorem 3.8 for the de nition of g f , g > , and g ? .
Notes:
1. Using Theorem 3.10, Corollaries 3.5, 3.6, and Proposition 3.3, it is easy to show that no subset of f:;^; _; ; ; ; t; f; >;?g with less than four connectives can be functionally complete. 2 . The fact that ? = f :f together with Proposition 3.13 imply that f:; ; ; ; fg is functionally complete. Hence^can be deleted from the set provided by the last part of Theorem 3.10 (in contrast to that given in Theorem 3.8!)
4 Reasoning in F OUR
The basic consequence relation
We start with the simplest consequence relation which naturally corresponds to FOUR. one cannot tell whether Nixon is a dove or a hawk (which seems reasonable given the con icting defaults). One can still infer the explicit information about Nixon, i.e. that he is a republican and a quaker. However, unlike in the classical case, the negations of these assertions cannot be inferred, despite the inconsistency. What can be inferred is their disjunction: :hawk(Nixon)_:dove(Nixon).
Proof system
One of the biggest advantages of j = 4 is that it has a corresponding proof system, which is both nice and e cient. Note: The last corollary together with the equivalence of`G BL and j = 4 mean that we can develop a tableaux proof system for j = 4 , which is almost identical to that of classical logic. 9 The main di erence is that unlike in classical logic, here a clause ?) is valid i ?\ 6 =;. One should note also that it is impossible here to translate a clause ? ) in which ? 6 = ; into a sentence of the language without using the implication connective !
As we have seen, j = 4 has a lot of nice properties. Still, it has some serious drawbacks as well:
It is too restrictive and \overcautious". Thus it is strictly weaker than classical logic even for consistent theories (a case in which one might prefer to use classical logic). Moreover, it totally rejects some very useful (and intuitively justi ed) inference rules, like the Disjunctive Syllogism: From :p and p_q one can never infer q by using j = 4 . Under normal circumstances we would certainly like to be able to use this rule!
In the next subsections we consider several possibilities of re ning j = 4 . The main theme is to restrict the set of models we take into account, using some preference criteria. This is the idea behind the notion of a preferential logic considered in Sh87, Sh88]. This idea has recently received a considerable attention (see, e.g., Ma89, KLM90, Pr91, LM92, KL92, Ma94, Sc97]).
Taking advantage of the other partial order
A natural approach for reducing the set of models which are used for drawing conclusions is to consider only the k-minimal models. The idea behind this approach is that we should not assume anything that is not really known. Keeping the amount of knowledge as minimal as possible may also be captured, at least in FOUR, as a kind of consistency preserving method: As long as one keeps the redundant information as minimal as possible the tendency of getting into con icts decreases.
De nition 4.10 Let 1 ; 2 be two four-valued valuations, and ? { a set of formulae. a) 1 is k-smaller than 2 ( 1 k 2 ) if for every atomic p, 1 Let C S M be a descending chain w.r.t. k . We shall show that C is bounded in S M , so by Zorn's lemma S M has a minimal element, which is the required k-minimal model. Let N be the the following valuation: N(p)=min k fM i (p) j M i 2Cg. N is de ned since C is a chain, and FOUR has a nite number of elements. Obviously N bounds C. It Corollary 4.15 In the monotonic fragment of the language (i.e., without ), the logics j = 4 and j = 4 k are identical.
Proposition 4.14 shows that as long as we are interested in inferring formulae that do not include , we can indeed limit ourselves to k-minimal models without any loss of generality. This in particular is the case when we are interested in inferring literals. Examples 4.12 and 4.13 show that this approach may lead to a considerable reduction in the number of models that should be checked.
The situation is completely di erent when we do allow the implication connective to appear on the right-hand side of j = 4 k : Using the example of the last proof, one can easily see that q j = 4 k :q p and also :q; :q pj = 4 k p, but :q; q 6 j = 4 k p. It follows that j = 4 k is not a consequence relation in the usual sense, since it is not closed under (multiplicative) cut. This is not surprising, since j = 4 k is not monotonic, and it is usual to require a nonmonotonic relation to be closed only under cautious cut (see Le92] and Section 4.5 below). Despite the nice properties of j = 4 k (more of which will be shown in the sequel; See the note at the end of Subsection 4.5.2), we will see in what follows (see, e.g., Example 4.22 below) that this consequence relation appears to be \too conservative". In the following subsections we consider therefore more subtle consequence relations.
A consequence relation for preferring consistency
Recall that the basic idea in taking the k-minimal models was to avoid meaningless (or redundant) information. A \by-product" of this approach is a reduction in the level of inconsistency of our set of assumptions. When we assume less, the tendency of getting into con icts decreases. In what follows we shall use a more direct approach of preserving consistency: Given a (possibly inconsistent) theory ?, the idea is to give precedence to those models of ? that minimize the amount of inconsistent beliefs in ?. Intuitively, I 1 is the set of inconsistent values of hFOURi (which in this case consists only of a single element), and I( ; I 1 ) corresponds to the inconsistent assignments of w.r.t. I 1 . 10 The meaning of f is that cannot be true. This, of course, is stronger than saying that is not a theorem, or even that : is a consequence of the assumptions. Here mcm(? 0 ; I 1 )=fM17, M18g. Thus, using j = 4 I 1 one can infer that bird(Tweety) (but :bird(Tweety) is not true), and fly(Tweety) (while :fly(Tweety) is not true). Also, nothing is yet known about Tweety being a penguin. Note that fly(Tweety) is not a consequence of j = 4 k (and so not a consequence of j = 4 as well), although it seems to be an intuitive conclusion of ? 0 . Therefore, as we have noted before, j = 4 k might be considered as \overcautious".
Suppose now that a new data arrives: penguin(Tweety) 
A consequence relation for preferring classical assignments
The approach presented in this subsection is similar to that of the previous one. The di erence is that this time we prefer de nite knowledge to an uncertain one. In particular, the approach taken here prefers classical inferences whenever their use is possible. Next we consider some common properties of j = 4 I 1 and j = 4 I 2 . In the rest of this section we shall write j = 4 I whenever the results apply to both these relations. Note that what the previous proposition claims is that GBL is sound for j = 4 I in the weak sense; once we add another rule to GBL there is no guarantee that the extended system would be sound for j = 4 I anymore, even if the new rule itself is sound for j = 4 I . Moreover, the last corollary does not claim that every single rule of GBL is sound for j = 4 I . In fact, as part (b) of the following proposition shows, this is not the case.
j = 4 I and GBL-rules
Proposition 4.36 a) ( b) A counter-example: Let p; q be atomic formulae. Then j = 4 I (p^:p) f; q and q^:q j = 4 I q, but ((p^:p) f) (q^:q)6 j = 4 I q (a counter I-mcm assigns > to p and f to q). For 
Comparison with general patterns of nonmonotonic reasoning
Being nonmonotonic, j = 4 I 1 and j = 4 I 2 do not respect weakening. Many rules for replacing weakening has been proposed in the study of general patterns of nonmonotonic reasoning (see, e.g., Ga85, Ma89, KLM90, FLM91, Le92, LM92, Ma94]). The logic proposed in most of these works is based on the two-valued propositional one. In particular, unlike in the present treatment, the consequence relations considered there are not paraconsistent. In what follows we consider some of the proposals of what should nonmonotonic systems look like, and adapt them to the four-valued case. In this way we would be able to give them paraconsistent capabilities.
De nition 4. The following de nition is a generalization of the notion of preferential logics, which has been introduced in KLM90]:
De nition 4.39 Let j = be a consequence relation (in the usual monotonic sense). Suppose that is a connective that is an internal implication w.r.t. j = and $ is a connective which is internal equivalence w.r.t. j = (see Proposition 4.3). Then a j =-preferential logic is a relation ) that is closed under the following conditions: 
Reducing the amount of the preferred models
A we have already noted, one of the advantages of j = 4 I 1 and j = 4 I 2 w.r.t. j = 4 is that the set of models needed for drawing conclusions from the formers is never bigger than that of the latter. In this subsection we consider cases in which it is possible to reduce the amount of the relevant models even further, without changing the logic. The idea is to take the composition of k and I ; Instead 
The monotonic classical fragment
We conclude this section with some results concerning the f_;^; :; t; fg-fragment of the language.
This fragment may be called the monotonic classical language. It is extensively discussed in the literature, and although it has relatively weak expressive power in the multi-valued setting, the corresponding fragments of our logics have many nice properties.
First, it is well known that with respect to the monotonic classical language j = 4 is identical to the set of \ rst degree entailments" in relevance logic (see AB75, Du86] Another important property of formulae in the monotonic classical language is that like in the classical case, every formulae can be translated to an equivalent formula in standard conjunctive normal form (CNF) or standard disjunctive normal form (DNF):
Proposition 4.46 Every formula in the monotonic classical language can be translated to a CNF-formula 0 and to a DNF-formula 00 s.t. for every valuation in FOUR, ( )= ( 0 )= ( 00 ).
Proof: The proof is similar to that of the classical case, using the fact that de-Morgan's laws, distributivity, commutativity, associativity, and the double negation rule (::
) remain valid in the four-valued case. 2
Another connection with classical logic is the following:
Proposition 4.47 Let ? be a classically consistent set in the monotonic classical language, and suppose that is a formula in CNF, non of its conjuncts is a tautology. 16 Then classically follows from ? i ?j = 4 I 1 .
Proof: ()) Assume rst that is a disjunction of literals, which is not a tautology. Suppose also that ? 6 j = 4 I 1 The last two propositions together with Proposition 4.42 entail that for checking whether a formula classically follows from a consistent set ?, it is su cient to perform the following steps:
1. convert the formula to a conjunctive normal form, 2. drop all the conjuncts which are tautologies, and 
Comparison with four-valued systems
The main advantage of using FOUR rather than three-valued systems is, of course, that it allows us to deal with both types of abnormal propositions in one system. In this section we show, moreover, that one can in any case do with FOUR everything one can do using only three values, sometimes even more e ciently. We start by showing that it is possible to simulate the basic three-valued logics in the context of FOUR. Denote by j = 3 Kl the consequence relation that corresponds to Kleene's logic (i.e. ? j = 3 Kl i every ft; f; ?g-model of ? is a ft; f; ?g-model of some formula in ), and by j = 3 LP the consequence relation of the logic LP 18 (i.e. ?j = 3 LP i every ft; f; >g-model of ? is a ft; f; >g-model of some formula in ). Then: Proposition 5. follows from this set. Since we consider paraconsistency as one of the major reasons for switching to multi-valued semantics, we shall concentrate in what follows on the other family of three-valued logics, in which the third value is designated.
We have already mentioned LP as the basic logic among the three-valued logics with middle element designated. It is well known that LP invalidates the Disjunctive Syllogism ( ; : _ 6 j = 3 LP ).
Priest Pr89, Pr91] argues that this is a drawback: a consistent theory should preserve classical conclusions. He suggests to resolve this drawback by considering as the relevant models of a set ? only those that are minimally inconsistent. Such models assign > only to some minimal set of atomic formulae. The consequence relation j = 3 LPm of the resulting logic, LPm, is then de ned as Proposition 5.4(b) together with Proposition 4.42 imply that a switch to four-valued semantics might improve the three-valued inference process of LPm: Let be a formula in the monotonic classical language. For checking whether ? j = 3 LPm , it is su cient to convert to a conjunctive normal form, remove every conjunct which contains some atomic formula together with its negation, and check the resulting formula only in the k-minimal I 1 -mcms of ?. The number of such models is usually smaller (and never bigger!) than the number of the LPm-models. This is due to the fact that from every k-minimal I 1 -mcm one can obtain several LPm-models by changing every ?-assignment to either t or f. Here is a very simple example: Let ? = f:p_q; p_qg. q follows from ? according to j = 3 LPm and so also according to j = 4 I 1 (and classically as well, of course). Now, ? has two LPm-models: fp : t; q : tg and fp : f; q : tg (these are also its classical models), but only one k-minimal I 1 -model: fp:?; q :tg. This single model su ces for inferring that q follows from ?. Figure 5 summarizes the relationships among the three-and four-valued consequence relations w.r.t the monotonic classical language. 19 One should remember, however, that important as it is, this language is quite limited. 6 More than four values are usually not necessary
In this section we consider a class of structures that naturally generalize hFOURi. We then generalize the above four-valued logics to those structures in an attempt to achieve more powerful inference mechanisms. The major result of this section is that this freedom to use more truth values does not add much; Each one of the multi-valued logics considered here can actually be characterized by one of our four-valued logics. The original motivation of Ginsberg for using bilattices was to provide a uniform approach for a diversity of applications in AI. In particular he treated rst order theories and their consequences, truth maintenance systems and formalisms for default reasoning. The algebraic structure of bilattices has been further investigated by Fitting and Avron Fi90b, Fi94, Av96] . Fitting has also shown that bilattices are very useful tools for providing semantic to logic programs: He proposed an extension of Smullyan's tableaux-style proof method to bilattice-valued programs, and showed that this 19 The observation that j = method is sound and complete with respect to a natural generalization of van-Emden and Kowalski's operator (see Fi90a, Fi91] 20 In what follows we shall continue to use^and _ for the meet and join of t , and , for the meet and join of k . Also, f and t still denote the respective least and greatest element w.r. b) Given (B; F), we will say that satis es ( j = ), i ( )2F. c) A valuation that satis es every formula in a given set of formulas, ?, is said to be a model of ?. Given (B; F), the set of the models of ? will be denoted mod(?).
Types of truth values and valuations
We assign to every element of a bilattice B and to every valuation in B a speci c type. 
Extending the four-valued logics to bilattice-based logics
In this section we introduce obvious generalizations of the logics of Section 4 to arbitrary logical bilattices. The main conclusion is that like in the case of the generalization of the classical twovalued logic to arbitrary Boolean algebra, no new logic is obtained. 6 . 2 2 Example 6.21 T > and T > T ? are respectively the minimal and maximal inconsistency set in every logical bilattice. In hFOURi the former set was denoted I 1 (4.19a) and the latter { I 2 (4.26a). These are the only inconsistency sets of hFOURi. Let 
Summary and conclusion
Bilattices are algebraic structures that have been shown useful in several areas of computer science.
The smallest non-degenerated bilattice, FOUR, consists of four elements, and it is usually associated with Belnap four-valued logic. The goal of this work has been to show that the logical role of FOUR among (logical) bilattices is similar to that the two-valued (classical) lattice has among Boolean algebras. As such, FOUR provides a useful framework for capturing classical reasoning (in cases its use is appropriate) as well as some standard non-monotonic methods and paraconsistent techniques.
We began this work by providing appropriate interpretations of the classical connectives in terms of FOUR, and adding to them connectives that correspond to the basic bilattice operations.
We have examined the expressive power of the various fragments of the resulting language, and
showed that (a fragment of) our language is functionally complete for FOUR.
With this syntactical tool in our disposal, we turned to considering the use of hFOURi as our main semantical tool. The existence of elements like > and ?, as well as the idea of ordering data according to degrees of knowledge, suggest that this structure should be particularly suitable for reasoning with uncertainty.
During the discussion on the importance of FOUR we have considered several inference relations that allow plausible reasoning mechanisms: j = 4 : This is a consequence relation in the standard sense of Tarski and Scott. It was called here \the basic consequence relation". We have shown that this relation is sound and complete w.r.t. the cut-free Gentzen type system GBL, monotonic, compact, and paraconsistent. Its main drawbacks are that it is strictly weaker than classical logic even for consistent theories, and that it always invalidates some intuitively justi ed inference rules, like the Disjunctive Syllogism. j = 4 k : This relation considers only the k-minimal models for making inferences. The idea behind its de nition is that we should not assume anything that is not really known. We have shown that as long as we are interested in inferring formulae that do not include our nonmonotonic , j = 4 k is equivalent to j = 4 . Therefore, in such cases we can indeed limit ourselves to the kminimal models without any loss of generality, and so reduce the amount of models required for making inferences. j = 4 I 1 : The idea here is to give precedence to the models that minimize the amount of inconsistent beliefs. This approach re ects the intuition that contradictory data corresponds to inadequate information about the real world, and therefore should be minimized. This relation is a plausibility logic, paraconsistent, nonmonotonic, and preferential. In the monotonic classical fragment of the language this relation can be used for e ciently checking which element of a given set of formulae classically follows from a given consistent theory. j = 4 I 2 : This relation prefers de nite knowledge to an uncertain one. Thus, the approach taken here is to prefer classical inferences whenever possible. Indeed, for consistent theories in the classical fragment this inference relation is identical to the classical one. In general, however, j = 4 I 2 is di erent than classical logic, since it is paraconsistent and nonmonotonic.
All these consequence relations can be generalized in a natural way to arbitrary logical bilattices. A natural question that arises at this point is whether by this generalization one obtains something that is not already available in hFOURi. Alternatively, one may wonder whether only three values su ce. Our answer to both questions is basically negative. We have shown that everything that can be done using three values is also possible in the four-valued setting, and even more e ciently. On the other hand, we gave a sequence of theorems that show that it is possible to characterize in FOUR any bilattice-valued version of the consequence relations mentioned above. The outcome is, as the title of this paper implies, a strong evidence for the fundamental logical role and usefulness of the four-valued framework.
